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Abstract
	 The	2011	Tohoku	Earthquake	was	huge	damage	to	Japan,	especially,	along	the	coasts	of	
Miyagi,	 Iwate,	 and	 Fukushima.	 There	 was	 catastrophic	 damage	 by	 tsunami	 created	 by	 this	
earthquake.	Japan	frequently	has	been	affected	by	strong	earthquake	before	Tohoku	Earthquake.	
Much	 has	 been	 emphasized	 about	 the	 impacts	 of	 human	 and	 physical	 visible	 damages	 since	
disasters	struck	and	there	are	a	lot	of	studies	about	disaster	in	terms	of	seismology,	meteorology,	
geology,	 structural	mechanics,	 etc.	 But,	 the	 invisible	 damages,	 such	 as	 supply	 chain	 network,	
production	system	has	been	obstructed,	not	revealed.	In	spite	of	our	experiences	in	huge	disasters,	
we	havenʼt	tried	to	unveil	these	invisible	damages.	In	fact,	the	automobile	industries	also	suffered	
a	great	loss	due	to	this	disaster.	Supplies	of	assemblies/products	from	Japan	had	stopped,	and	
interrupted	other	production	activities	in	the	world.	
	 In	order	to	unveil	invisible	damages,	this	paper	describes	the	affects	to	the	supply	chain	
network,	production	system	in	Japanese	automobile	manufacturers	by	two	disasters	-	the	2011	
Tohoku	Earthquake	and	the	2007	Niigata	Chuetsu-offshore	Earthquake-.	 In	addition,	 to	unveil	
fundamental	 issues	 of	 their	 damages,	 there	 are	 the	 research	 questions;	 “Why	 did	 automobile	
manufacturers	immediately	decide	all	assembly	plantsʼ	shutdown”,	“Whatʼs	the	difference	of	the	
impacts	by	disaster	and	depression”	and,	“Is	the	limitation	of	the	JIT	really	exists,	or	not”.
Keywords :	Disaster,	JIT,	Supply	Chain,	Japanese	Automobile	Manufacturers
1．Introduction
	 Automobile	manufacturers	on	the	top	of	hierarchy	of	Automobile	industry	assemble	cars.	
First	 Tier	 suppliers	 supply	 major	 components	 such	 as	 body,	 engine,	 and	 transmission,	 to	
automobile	manufacturers.	The	Second	Tier	suppliers	furnish	the	sub-assembly/components	that	
the	First	Tier	suppliers	require.	Similarly,	lower	level	suppliers	supply	higher	level	suppliers.	If	
only	one	component	is	unavailable,	then	the	production	process	is	interrupted.
	 Around	2008,	there	was	the	worldwide	depression	caused	by	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis	
of	Lehman	Brothers	in	the	US,	and	in	2011,	there	was	the	Tohoku	Earthquake.		These	crisis	and	
disaster	 affected	 the	 Japanese	 automobile	 industry.	 The	 demand	 for	 automobiles	 also	 rapidly	
dropped	due	to	the	subprime	mortgage	crisis,	and	then,	the	supply	of	automobiles	was	further	
delayed	by	the	Earthquake.	Especially,	in	the	situation	of	globalized	and	centralized	suppliers	in	
the	lower	tiers;	if	these	suppliers	were	affected	by	a	disaster,	the	production	at	supplierʼs	plant	
Disaster Management and JIT of Automobile 
Supply Chain
Toko Sasaki
＊SASAKI,	Toko〔情報システム学科〕
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
―   ―82
stop,	then	almost	every	automobile	manufacturer	will	be	affected	by	it.
2．Supply Chain Network of Japanese Automobile Industry
	 The	Japanese	automobile	supply	chain	network	is	very	complex.	The	Japanese	automobile	
supplier	network	is	called	“keiretsu”.	This	“keiretsu”	structure	of	assembler-supplier	relationship	
historically	 enabled	 Japanese	 automobile	 manufacturers	 to	 remain	 lean	 and	 flexible	 while	
enjoying	a	level	of	control	over	supply	akin	to	that	of	vertical	integration	(Ahmadjian	and	Lincoln	
2000).	The	Japanese	automobile	industry	was	like	a	pyramid,	(as	shown	in	Figure	1a),	divided	
into	 three	or	any	more	 tiers	of	suppliers,	 centred	around	 the	seven	main	assembly	groups	or	
single	assemblers	-	Toyota-Daihatsu-Hino,	Nissan-Subaru-Nissan	Diesel,	Honda,	Mazda,	Mitsubishi,	
Isuzu,	and	Suzuki	(Shimokawa	1994).	The	Japanese	supplier	network	had	a	hierarchical	structure,	
with	 each	 major	 car	 manufacturer	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy.	 In	 the	 1980s,	 the	 in-house	
production	ratio	of	Japanese	car	manufacturers	was	comparatively	lower	than	those	of	US	and	
European	car	manufacturers	(Konno	2005).	In	Japan,	only	about	30-40	percent	of	parts	was	ʻin-
houseʼ.	 In	 North	 America	 and	 Europe	 up	 until	 the	 early	 1980s,	 the	 rate	 of	 ʻin-houseʼ	 parts	
production	was	60	percent	to	70	percent	(Shimokawa	1994).
	 However,	in	the	1990s,	the	Japanese	automobile	industry	faced	several	crises,	such	as	the	
Figure 1:	Supply	Chain	Network	of	Automobile	Industry
(a)  Pyramidal Structure
The rate of 〝In- house” parts production is 20-30%
(b) Diamond Structure
(Barrel Structure)
The rate of 〝In- house〞 parts production was 30-40%
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collapse	of	ʼbubbleʼ	economy,	the	yenʼs	appreciation	(1990:140	yen,	1995:79	yen	to	the	dollar),	
the	1995	Kobe	Earthquake,	and	the	increase	of	the	consumption	tax	(from	3	percent	to	5	percent;	
1997).		Due	to	the	impact	of	these	crises,	the	Japanese	automobile	industry	accelerated	shifting	
of	production	to	overseas	site,	moving	toward	optimal	parts,	and	promotion	of	the	establishment	
Figure 2: The Changes of Supply Chain Network of Automobile Industry
In the lower tier, some weak 
companies in price and/or 
quality competitiveness 
disappeared.
Superior companies in price
and/or quality remained.
Similarly, some weak companies
disappeared, superior companies
remained and became bigger.
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Centralized
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across the Keiretsu.
The ﬁrst and second tier parts are decentralized suppliers,
the lower tier parts are centralized in speciﬁc companies
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of	a	global	supply	network.	In	fact,	there	are	some	Japanese	companies	which	supply	parts	to	not	
only	 assemblers	 inside	 the	 keiretsu	 group	 but	 also	 outside	 the	 group,	 as	 shown	 Figure	 1b.	
Moreover,	 some	 of	 the	 major	 parts	 manufacturers	 supply	 the	 entire	 Japanese	 automobile	
manufacturers.	 In	 fact,	 a	 lot	 of	 suppliers	 in	 the	 lower	 tier	 provide	 own	 products	 across	 the	
keiretsu.	 The	 first	 and	 second	 tier	 parts	 (functional	 components)	 are	 decentralized	 amongst	
several	suppliers,	the	lower	tier	parts	(simple	components)	are	centralized	in	one	company	that	
uses	specialized	process	technology	(Fujimoto	2011).	This	is	the	“diamond	structure”	or	“barrel	
structure”	of	supply	chain	of	Japanese	automobile	industry.	Figure	2	shows	the	changes	of	this	
structure.
	 In	pyramidal	structure	case,	as	shown	Figure	3a,	if	disaster	suffers	in	the	lower	supplierʼs	
plant,	although	automobile	assembly	plants	not	damage,	they	were	interrupted.	Because	of	the	
supply	of	components	from	the	suppliers	in	the	lower	tiers	stopped.	The	impact	of	automobile	
industry	affected	in	the	“keiretsu”	group.		On	the	other	hand,	in	diamond	structure	case,	in	this	
situation	 of	 centralized	 suppliers	 in	 the	 lower	 tiers,	 as	 shown	 Figure	 3b;	 the	 production	 at	
suppliersʼ	plant	stop,	then	almost	every	automobile	manufacturer	are	affected	by	it.
	 In	 2007,	 about	 four	 years	 before	 the	 2011	 Tohoku	 earthquake,	 there	 was	 a	 strong	
earthquake	in	Niigata.	This	earthquake	isnʼt	known	well,	but	Rikenʼs	Kashiwazaki	Plant	in	Niigata	
had	 huge	 damage	 by	 this	 earthquake,	 affecting	 the	 operations	 of	 all	 of	 Japanʼs	 automobile	
manufacturers.	
	 For	 the	 following	 chapter,	 I	 will	 attempt	 to	 clarify	 the	 effects	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 small	
component	in	automobile	affected	to	entire	Japanese	automobile	industry.
3．Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plant (2007 Niigata Chuetsu-offshore Earthquake)
3.1 Rikenʼs Overview
	 The	Riken	Corporationʼs	major	products	are	piston	ring	of	engine	parts	and	seal	ring	of	
transmission	parts,	as	shown	Table	1.	There	are,	depending	on	Rikenʼs	parts,	different	companies	
that	 Riken	 supplies	 parts.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Mazda,	 directly	 procure	 piston	 rings	 from	 Riken,	
transmission	parts	are	supplied	from	Riken	to	Jatco	(transmission	manufacture	in	Nissan	keiretsu),	
Figure 3: The Damages of Supply Chain Network by Disaster
(a)  Pyramidal Structure (b) Diamond Structure
(Barrel )
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after	then	supplied	to	Mazda.	Power	steeringʼs	parts	are	supplied	from	KYB	(Kayaba	Co.,	Ltd.),	and	
then	supplied	to	Mazda.	Riken	produces	them	in	Rikenʼs	Kashiwazaki	Plant.	In	2007,	this	Plant	
had	 huge	 damage	 from	 the	 Niigata	 Chuetsu-offshore	 Earthquake.	 The	 seismic	 center	 of	 this	
earthquake	 was	 close	 to	 the	 Rikenʼs	 Kashiwazaki	 plant.	 The	 Rikenʼs	 Kashiwazaki	 Plants	 had	
suspended	 operations	 for	 one	 week	 after	 this	 earthquake,	 then,	 the	 Japanese	 automobile	
manufacturers	also	interrupted	operation.	
3.2 Rikenʼs Piston Rings
	 The	Rikenʼs	Kashiwazaki	Plant	products	approximately	50	percent	of	the	piston	rings	that	
used	by	the	entire	automobile	industry	in	Japan	(the	world	market	share	was	approximately	20	
percent).	There	are	only	three	companies	of	piston	ring	in	Japan,	thus,	piston	ring	market	is	an	
oligopoly.	In	this	market,	Riken	supplies	the	most	piston	rings	to	all	automobile	manufacturers,	as	
shown	Chart	1.	Since	all	automobile	manufacturers	depended	on	the	supply	of	piston	rings	and	
other	 components	 from	 Rikenʼs	 Kashiwazaki	 Plant,	 all	 plants	 of	 automobile	 manufacturers	
suspended	production.
3.3 Chronological Events at Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plant (Operations)
	 Following	the	occurrence	of	the	earthquake	on	16	July	2007,	all	the	production	lines	had	
stopped	 at	 Rikenʼs	 Kashiwazaki	 Plant.	 Fortunately,	 16	 July	 was	 holiday.	 Although,	 Rikenʼs	
Kashiwazaki	Plant	was	off	duty,	 several	 employees	were	 injured	while	working	on	equipment	
maintenance	at	Rikenʼs	facilities.	As	to	the	equipment,	there	occurred	some	slide	slip,	some	pieces	
Table 1: Overview of the Riken Corporation 
Capital ￥8,573,597,000	(as	of	March	2011,	all	of	Riken	Corporation)
Number	of	Employees 1,627	(as	of	March	2011,	all	of	Riken	Corporation)
Major	Products
Piston	Ring	
　　◦Engine	parts
　　◦Approx.	50%	of	domestic	market	share
Seal	Ring	
　　◦Transmission	parts
　　◦Approx.	70%	of	domestic	market	share
Major	
Customers
Automobile	and	other	Vehicle	
Manufacturers	
Honda,	 Suzuki,	 Toyota,	 Nissan,	 Fuji	 Heavy	 Industries.	 Ltd,	
Mitsubishi,	 Mazda,	 Daihatsu,	 Mitsubishi	 Fuso	 Truck	 and	 Bus,	
Nissan	 Diesel,	 Hino,	 Isuzu,	 Yamaha,	 Kawasaki	 Heavy	 Industries.	
Ltd,	Ford,	BMW,	VW/Audi,	OPEL,	FIAT,	Renault,	Porsche,	Jaguar,	
Hyundai,	Kia
Distributors	and	Sales	Agents	
for	Automobile	Parts
Eiwa,	 Empire,	 Auto	 Parts	 Uematsu,	 Global	 Tsusho,	 Chicago	
Product,	Sumisho	Machinery	Trade,	Daisho	Trading,	TMT	Trading,	
Toko	 Trading,	 Parts	 International,	 Heian	 Boeki,	 Meiji	 Sangyo,	
Motorix	International
Automotive	Parts	
Manufacturers	
Aisin	 AW,	 Jatco,	 Musashi	 Seimitsu	 Industries,	 Calsonic	 Kansei,	
KYB,	 Nissin	 Kogyo,	 Yamaha	 Marine,	 BrotherPrecisionIndustry,	
Valeo,	Aisin	Seiki,	Waga	Precision,	ZF
Source:	Corporate	Information	of	Riken
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
―   ―86
of	the	equipment	got	lopsided	or	toppled	over.	Some	of	products	that	were	finished	or	in	process,	
molds,	jigs	and	tools,	and	measuring	instruments	fell	to	the	floor.	Rikenʼs	machineʼs	losses	were	
100	million	yen,	inventoryʼs	losses	were	200	million	yen,	and	it	took	recovery	cost	1,200	million	
yen	(consolidated).
	 The	automobile	manufacturers	voluntarily	provided	assistance	with	engineering	and	repair	
immediately	after	earthquake	and	helped	Riken	restart	much	more	quickly	than	it	would	have	
been	able	to	on	its	own.	They	helped	clean	up	and	repair	the	damage	to	manufacturing	equipment	
and	 the	 loss	of	building	contents.	Total	number	of	assistances	was	approximately	9,000	from	
about	 25	 automobile	 manufacturers	 and	 automobile	 parts	 manufacturers.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	
Chart 1: Monthly Supplies and Purchases of Piston Rings in Japan, in 2005
Source:  Daniel E. Supply Chain Disruption Risk and Recovery: Temporary Diversiﬁcation and Its Limits, 2011
Table 2: Recovery at Rikenʼs Kashiwazaki Plant 
Date
Days
Later
Events Operations
16	July	
2007
0
The	2007	Chuetsu	Offshore	Earthquake	struck	at	10:13	a.m.
All	the	production	lines	at	Rikenʼs	Kashiwazaki	plat	had	stopped.
Toyota	sent	Riken	about	20	employees	to	assess	the	situation	of	the	damages.
0%
17	July	-	
2007
1 6	companies	voluntarily	provided	41	assistances	to	Rikenʼs	Kashiwazaki	Plant.	 0%
18	July	
2007
2 Mazda	sent	Riken	8	employees.	 0%
19	July	-
2007
3
There	were	700	skilled	volunteers	from	automoble	manufacturers	and	parts	
manufacturers.	(	Toyota:200	employees,	Mazda:	13	maintenance	engineers)
0%
22	July	
2007
6 Riken	started	trial	operation. 0%
23	July	
2007
7
Riken	resumed	productions	of	major	products	 (piston	rings,	seal	 rings,	and	
camshafts)	at	10	a.m.	Part	of	the	lines	didnʼt	resume	yet.
25	companies	provided	830	assistances	23-24	July.
Almost
100%
1	August	
2007
16 Riken	announced	Rikenʼs	complete	recovery. 100%
Source:	Press	Release	of	Riken	and	articles	of	Nihon	Keizai	Shinbun	(Japanʼs	most	prestigious	economic	newspaper)
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Automobile/parts	manufacturers	provide	five	times	as	many	assistances	as	Rikenʼs	employees.	
Table	2	shows	the	chronological	events	at	Rikenʼs	Kashiwazaki	Plant.	On	23	July	which	one	week	
after	the	earthquake,	Rikenʼs	Kashiwazaki	Plant	resumed	operations.	
3.4 The Rikenʼs Affects to Japanese Automobile Manufacturers 
	 Riken	 has	 specialized	 in	 design	 and	 technologies	 of	 piston	 rings	 and	 other	 automobile	
components,	so	that	other	suppliers	donʼt	imitate	it	easily.	All	major	automobile	manufacturers	in	
Japan	depend	on	Rikenʼs	piston	rings	and	other	parts.	In	addition	to	specialization,	“Just-in-Time”	
that	aimed	to	reduce	 the	 inventory	 level	of	components	at	automobile	manufacturers	and	the	
upper	 tail	 suppliers,	 had	 stopped	 productions	 of	 automobiles	 in	 Japan.	 Figure	 4	 shows	 the	
operations	 by	 automobile	 manufacturers	 after	 2007	 Niigata	 Chuetsu-offshore	 Earthquake.	
Although	Toyota,	Subaru,	Suzuki,	and	Daihatsu	had	suspended	operations	from	19	July,	Mazda	
went	on	operating.	Because	plants	of	Mazda	are	 in	 the	 far	distance	 from	Rikenʼs	Kashiwazaki	
Plant,	so	that	there	was	a	time	lag	of	the	delivery.	This	is	similar	to	Hondaʼs	mini-vehicle	production	
line	in	Kumamoto	Plant.	
4．Renesas Electronics Corporationʼs Naka Plant (2011 Tohoku Earthquake)
4.1 Renesas Electronics Corporationʼs Overview
	 The	major	products	of	Renesas	Electronics	Corporation	(REC)	are	Microcontroller,	System	
LSIs/System	on	Chip	(SoC)	Devices,	and	Analog	&	Power	Devices,	as	shown	Table	3.	In	2011,	REC	
had	 huge	 damage	 from	 the	 Tohoku	 Earthquake.	 Especially,	 RECʼs	 Nala	 Plan	 had	 suspended	
operations	for	82	days	after	earthquake.	RECʼs	Naka	Plant	produced	a	little	less	than	20	percent	
of	RECʼs	Microcontroller	Units	(MCUs)	and	System	LSIs/SoC	Solutions,	and	a	little	less	than	10	
percent	of	RECʼs	Analog	&	Power	Devices.
4.2 RECʼs Microcontroller
	 REC	is	the	worldʼs	largest	manufacturers	of	MCU	with	market	share.	Chart	2a	shows	the	
worldwide	MCU	market	share	in	2010	from	the	Databeans	Estimate.	In	2010,	before	the	Tohoku	
Source: Press Releases of each automobile manufacturers and articles of Nihon Keizai Shinbun
Figure 4: Operations of Major 8 Automobile Manufacturers in Japan
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Earthquake,	the	MCU	market	share	of	REC	was	30.0	percent,	the	MCU	revenue	of	REC	was	4,441	
million	dollar.	According	to	other	market	research	companies,	RECʼs	MCU	market	share	was	29	
percent	(Gartner),	27.3	percent	(IHS	iSuppli)	in	2010.
	 In	2010,	the	automotive	MCU	market	(5,358	million	dollar)	was	36.2	percent	of	the	total	
MCU	market	 (14,800	million	dollar).	Chart	2b	 shows	 the	worldwide	automotive	MCU	market	
share	in	2010	from	the	Databeans	Estimate.	The	automotive	MCU	market	share	of	REC	was	41.5	
percent,	the	automotive	MCU	revenue	of	REC	was	2,221million	dollar.
4.3 Chronological Events of RECʼs Naka Plant (Operations)
	 The	impact	of	the	earthquake	on	11	March	2011	caused	eight	RECʼs	plants	(include	Naka	
Plant)	out	of	twenty	two	of	RECʼs	plants	in	Japan	to	immediately	shut	down	production.	These	
Table 3: Overview of Renesas Electronics Corporation (as of April 2012)
Capital ￥153.2	billion
Number	of	Employees 44,000(Consolidated)
Major	Product Microcontroller
System	LSIs/SoC	Devices.
Analog	&	Power	Devices.
Group	Companies 	In	Japan
◦　1	Sales	Companies.
◦　14	Manufacturing	and	Engineering	Service	Companies.
◦　7	Design	and	Application	Technologies	Companies.
◦　2	Business	Corporations	and	Others.
Overseas
◦　11	Sales	Companies.
◦　8	Manufacturing	and	Engineering	Service	Companies.
◦　4	Design	and	Application	Technologies	Companies.
◦　6	Business	Corporations	and	Others.
Source:	Corporate	Outline	of	RECʼs
Source:  Databeans Estimates, Company Reports 
Note:  Amount of the MCU revenue was 14.8 billion dollar in 2010 
           Amount of the automotive MCU revenue was 5.36 billion dollar in 2010
Chart 2: Worldwide MCU Market Share by Suppliers in 2010 
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Figure 5: Locations of RECʼs Plants
Temporarily Shut down 
Front-end line: 5 plants
Back-end line: 3 plants
Center of Earthquake
REC’s Naka Pla
Back-end Line
(Assembly & Test: 12 plants)
Front-end Line
 (Wafer Fabrication: 10 plants)
Table 4: Chronological Events at RECʼs Naka Plant
Date
After	
days
Events
11	March
2011
0
The	2011	Tohoku	Earthquake	struck	at	2:46	p.m.
7	(include	Naka	Plant)	out	of	22	of	RECʼs	plants	in	Japan	have	temporarily	shut	
down	production.
RECʼs	production	volume	felt	to	approximately	50%.
13-14	March	
2011
2-3
8	RECʼs	offices/sites	in	Japan	had	been	impacted	from	the	blackout	measure	by	
Tokyo	 Electric	 Power	 Company,	 These	 offices/sites	 shut	 down	 operation	
production.
21	March
2011
10 REC	estimated	that	Naka	Plant	will	resume	part	of	production	on	1	September.
28	March	
2011
17 REC	announced	that	Naka	Plant	will	resume	part	of	production	on	15	July.
22	April	
2011
42 REC	announced	that	Naka	Plant	will	resume	part	of	production	on	15	June.	
23	April
2011
43 Naka	Plant	started	test	production	at	the	200-mm	wafer	fabrication	line.	
25	April
2011
45 Naka	Plant	started	test	production	at	the	300-mm	wafer	fabrication	line.	
11	May
2011
61
REC	 published	 that	 Naka	 Plant	 will	 resume	 200-mm	 wafer	 fabrication	 line	 of	
production	at	Naka	Plant	on	1	June,	300-mm	line	of	production	on	6	June.
1	June
2011
82 200-mm	wafer	fabrication	line	started	mass	production.
6	June	
2011
87 System	LSI	(300-mm)	wafer	fabrication	line	started	mass	production.
10	June
2011
91
REC	announced	that	timing	on	when	the	supply(shipment)	capacity	will	return	to	
that	of	pre-earthquake	levels	in	the	end	of	September.
June	2011 RECʼs	production	volume	recovered	to	approximately	85%.
Mid-September
2011	
The	supply(shipment)	capacity	returned	to	that	more	than		pre-earthquake.
Source:	Press	Release	of	REC	and	articles	of	Nihon	Keizai	Shinbun
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plants	were	five	semiconductor	wafer	plants	and	three	assembly	plants,	as	shown	Figure	5.	Due	
to	plantʼs	shutdown,	production	volume	of	the	whole	RECʼs	200-mm	wafer	fabrication	felt	to	50	
percent	after	this	earthquake.	
	 Table	4	shows	the	chronological	events	at	RECʼs	Naka	Plant.	RECʼs	Naka	Plant	was	the	worst	
affected	 in	 all	 RECʼs	 plants.	 Although,	 just	 after	 the	 Tohoku	 Earthquake,	 initial	 predictions	
estimated	that	Nala	plant	would	resume	production	in	September	2011,	 in	fact,	production	at	
Naka	 Plant	 restarted	 on	 1	 June	 2011.	 The	 supply/shipment	 capacity	 returned	 that	 of	 pre-
earthquake	levels	in	the	middle	of	September	2011,	six	months	after	the	2011	Tohoku	Earthquake.	
Total	 number	 of	 assistances	 was	 approximately	 80,000,	 and	 there	 were	 maximum	 2,500	
assistances	per	day.	This	number	was	many	more	 than	1,900	employees	of	RECʼs	Naka	Plant	
(including	its	relation	corporations).
4.4 The 2011 Tohoku Earthquakeʼs Affects to Automobile Manufacturers
	 REC	 is	a	major	manufacturer	of	MCUs	which	Japanese	companies	holding	a	 large	share	
worldwide.	The	effect	on	customer	companiesʼ	supply	chain	was	very	large.	In	fact,	the	Japanese	
Automobile	 manufacturers	 had	 been	 hit	 hard	 by	 shortages	 of	 MCUs	 and	 other	 components,	
causing	RECʼs	plants	and	other	lower	tiers	had	shutdown.	Most	automobile	manufacturers	was	
few	direct	damage	to	plants	by	the	earthquake,	but	Nissanʼs	Iwaki	plant	had	with	aftershocks	still	
heavily	impacted	the	region,	 its	recovery	took	longer	than	the	other	plants.	Toyota	suspended	
production	at	all	plants	for	about	two	weeks	between	from	14	March	to	26	March.	Following	this,	
the	domestic	automobile	productions	of	Toyota	in	March	2011	was	recorded	as	129,491	units.	
Compared	with	the	347,281	units	total	recorded	for	the	same	month	of	the	previous	year,	this	is	
a	decrease	of	217,790	unit	or	37.3	percent.	It	was	the	38	days	after	the	Tohoku	Earthquake	that	
all	Toyotaʼs	plants	resumed	operation.	Similarly,	others	took	about	a	month	to	resume	all	plantʼs	
operation.
	 Table	 5	 shows	 the	 reductions	 in	 production	 by	 the	 Tohoku	 Earthquake.	 Automobile	
production	of	 the	whole	Japanese	automobile	manufacturers	 in	March	2011	was	recorded	as	
403,937	 units.	 Compared	with	 the	 945,220	 units	 total	 recorded	 for	 the	 same	month	 of	 the	
previous	year,	this	is	a	decrease	of	541,283	unit	or	42.7	percent.	Itʼs	also	5.3	times	as	many	as	
the	reductions	in	the	2007	Niigata	Chuetsu-offshore	Earthquake	and	over	38	times	of	the	1995	
Kobe	Earthquake.
Table 5: Reductions in Productions by the Earthquake
Earthquake Reduction Productions
The	1995	Kobe	Earthquake
14,021
(January	1995)
January	1994:	772,858
January	1995:	758,837
The	2007	Niigata	Chuetsu-offshore	Earthquake
101,636
(July	2007)
July	2006:	977,856
July	2007:	876,220
The	2011	Tohoku	Earthquake
541,283
	(March	2011)
March	2010:	945,220
March	2009:	403,937
Source:	Active	Matrix	Database	System	of	JAMA	
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5．Summary of Earthquake Effects on Production
5.1 Earthquakeʼs Effects to Automobile Manufacturers 
5.1.1 The Effect to Automobile Manufacturersʼ Operation
	 After	 both	 earthquakes,	 Japanese	 automobile	 manufacturers	 decided/executed	 the	
disruption	of	all	assembly	plants	early.	In	case	of	Toyota,	on	the	evening	of	the	19	July,	2.5	days	
after	 the	 2007	 Niigata	 Chuetsu-offshore	 Earthquake,	 all	 Toyotaʼs	 plants	 started	 to	 suspend	
operation.	Similarly,	after	the	2011	Tohoku	Earthquake,	all	plants	started	to	suspend	operation	3	
days	later.	The	average	number	of	days	of	the	major	eight	automobile	manufacturers	was	3.6	(in	
2007),	and	3.0	(in	2011),	as	shown	P1	in	Figure	6.
	 Considering	the	huge	scales	of	these	earthquakes	and	damages	by	them,	their	decision	of	
the	shutdowns	and	the	resumption	of	operations	ware	speedy	and	appropriately.	The	reason	why	
Japanese	 automobile	 manufacturers	 decided/executed	 the	 disruption	 so	 early	 after	 both	
earthquakes,	there	were	related	to	the	Toyota	Production	System	(TPS)	that	a	widely	accepted	
production	system.	TPS	was	established	based	on	two	concepts	-	“jidoka”	and	“Just	in	Time	(JIT)”-.	
“jidoka”	 means	 that	 when	 a	 problem	 occurs,	 the	 equipment	 stops	 immediately,	 preventing	
defective	products	 from	being	produced.	 For	 this	 reason,	 there	were	not	wrong	decisions	 for	
Japanese	automobile	manufacturers	to	stop	production	lines/plant	by	both	disasters.	The	second	
Earthquake All plants operated Some plants operated partially All plants stopped operation
* P1: The number of days from the day on which the earthquake stroke until the day on which all assembly plants stopped operation.
** P2: The period of days in which all assembly plants stopped operation
*** P3: The number of days from the day on which the earthquake stroke until the day on which all assembly plants resumed operation.
Figure 6:	Comparison	of	Automobile	Manufacturerʼs	Recovery	Time
TOYOTA
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Jul
24
Jul
25
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Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed
2007 Niigata
2007 Niigata 2011 Tohoku
P1* P2** P3*** P1* P2** P3***
Toyota 2.5 4.5 9 3 14 38
Nissan 4 5 9 1 18 38
Honda 7 1.5 9 4 9 31
Mazda 5 2 9 3 8 24
Mitsubishi 4 3 9 3 2 38
Subaru 2.5 5.5 9 3 9 25
Suzuki 3 4 9 3 8 25
Daihatsu 2.5 3.5 9 4 7 38
Average 3.8 3.6 9.0 3.0 9.4 32.1
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is	the	concept	of	JIT,	in	which	each	process	produces	only	what	is	needed,	when	it	is	need,	and	in	
the	amount	needed.	“Just	in	Time”	made	eliminating	unnecessary	inventories	in	process.	To	keep	
inventories	to	acceptably	low	level	achieve	not	only	cost	reduction	but	fast	recovery.	It	is	important	
for	disaster-struck	plans	to	recover	quickly	from	the	destructive	effects	of	seismic	disaster.
5.1.2 Speed of the Recovery 
	 As	shown	P3	in	Figure	6,	in	the	case	of	Toyota,	on	25	July,	9	days	after	the	2007	Niigata	
Chuetsu-offshore	Earthquake,	 all	Toyotaʼs	plants	 resumed	operation.	 Similarly,	 after	 the	2011	
Tohoku	Earthquake,	all	plants	resumed	operation	38	days	later.	The	average	number	of	recovery	
days	of	the	major	eight	automobile	manufacturers	was	9.0	in	the	2007	earthquake,	and	32.1	in	
the	2011	earthquake.	Like	this,	it	took	over	a	month	to	resume	the	operation	of	all	plants	in	the	
2011	Tohoku	Earthquake.	
	 This	 delay	 effects	 to	 the	 recovery	 speed	 of	 production.	 Chart	 3	 shows	 the	 rate	 of	 the	
domestic	production	of	all	automobile	manufacturers	for	one	year	after	the	earthquake.	Although	
the	whole	Japanese	automobile	manufactures	had	recovered	their	production	after	a	month	of	
the	2007	Niigata	Chuetsu-offshore	Earthquake,	it	took	five	months	until	the	production	of	them	
returned	to	normal	production	after	the	2011	Tohoku	Earthquake.	
5.2 Chronological Changes of the Domestic Product in Japan
	 Chapter	9	shows	the	changes	of	the	domestic	automobile	products	in	Japan	from	January	
1995	through	March	2012.	It	appears	two	things	from	this	chapter.	First,	the	disasterʼs	impacts	
to	Japanese	automobile	manufacturersʼ	production	were	not	more	than	the	depressionʼs	impacts.	
Chart 3:	The	changes	(%)	of	the	Domestic	Automobile	Products
Source:  Active Matrix Database System of JAMA 
Note:  The previous year’s result indexed at 100 
(Months later)
新潟国際情報大学 情報文化学部 紀要
―   ―93
Second,	the	recovery	speeds	of	Japanese	automobile	manufacturerʼs	production	at	disasters	were	
quicker	 rather	 than	 the	 depressions.	 Especially,	 in	 the	 Tohoku	 Earthquake,	 there	 was	 huge	
damage	not	only	to	the	Japanese	automobile	industry	but	also	to	the	whole	economy	in	Japan.	
Japanese	automobile	manufacturers	also	rapidly	decreased	their	products	by	interrupting	of	the	
assembly	plants.	Despite	of	them,	the	recovery	speed	after	this	earthquake	was	quicker	than	that	
of	the	depression	such	as	the	Lehman	Shock.	
5.3 Disaster and JIT
	 As	shown	Table	6,	 in	 the	case	of	 JIT,	 the	 inventory	 level/cost	of	 the	assembly	plants	of	
automobile	manufacturers	is	lower,	the	transportation	cost	is	higher.	Because	the	lead	times	of	
the	transportation	are	shorter	and	more	frequent.	Due	to	the	fewer	inventories,	the	adaptability	
of	environments	such	as	depression	and	crisis	is	higher	than	non	JIT.	
	 After	both	Earthquakes,	there	were	not	a	few	articles	that	insisted	of	the	limitations	of	JIT	
in	newspaper,	journal,	and	public	reports.	But	their	arguments	focused	on	that	the	lower	inventory	
caused	to	the	shutdown	of	plants	after	a	disaster.	As	was	mentioned	Section	5.1,	there	were	not	
wrong	decisions	for	Japanese	automobile	manufacturers	 to	 immediately	stop	their	production	
plants	by	both	disasters.	It	was	very	important	to	recovery	production	quickly.	Because	of	the	
Japanese	automobile	manufacturers	knew	it,	they	voluntarily	provided	a	lot	of	assistances	to	the	
damaged	plants	of	the	lower	tier	companies	doe	to	recover	plants	quickly.		As	shown	Table	11,	in	
JIT	 case,	 the	 recovery	 speeds	 are	 quick,	 excluding	 large	 scale	 disasters	 such	 as	 the	 Tohoku	
Earthquake.	This	is	reason	that	the	loss	on	disposal	of	inventories	at	the	damaged	plants	reduces.	
If	damaged	plants	have	a	lot	of	inventories,	the	loss	on	disposal	of	inventories	increase,	they	need	
more	time	to	recover.	Therefore,	it	is	impossible	to	say	definitely	that	the	limitation	of	JIT	exists	
in	the	situation	of	disasters.
	 As	 for	 the	 risk	mitigation	 strategy	 to	 deal	with	 large	 scale	 disruptions	 of	 supply	 chain	
Chart 4:		The	changes	(Units)	of	the	Domestic	Automobile	Products	from	Jan	1995	through	Jan	
2011
Source:  Active Matrix Database System of JAMA 
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network,	make	provisions	to	move	to	alternative	sites	for	production,	if	they	are	unable	to	produce	
component	by	a	disaster,	as	shown	Figure	7.	In	Riken	and	REC	cases,	 in	spite	of	the	damaged	
plants	disrupted	for	a	long	time,	they	were	not	able	to	immediately	produce	equivalent	components	
in	other	plants.	This	reasons	 that	both	corporations	created	 the	higher	 technical	skill	and	 the	
strength	of	price	competitiveness	in	a	plant,	come	to	hold	a	relatively	large	world	market	share	of	
some	particular	automobile	components
6. Conclusion
	 This	paper	has	revealed	the	invisible	damages	by	focusing	on	the	effects	to	the	supply	chain	
Table 6: Comparisons of JIT and Non JIT
Normal
Inventory
Level / Cost
Transportation
L.T. / Cost
Environment
Adaptability
JIT Low	/	Low Short	/	High High
Non	JIT High	/	High Long	/	Low Low
Abnormal
(Depression)
Storage
Time
Inventory
Cost
Inventory
Risk
JIT Constant	(Short) Constant	(Low) Constant	(Low)
Non	JIT Longer Higher Higher
Abnormal
(Disaster)
Shutdown of Plants
Loss on disposal of 
Inventories
Recovery Speed of Plants
JIT
Damaged	Plants:	
　　　Immediately
Other	Plants:
　　　Earlier
Damaged	Plants:	
　　　　　Low
Other	Plants:
　　　　　Non
Damaged	Plants:	
　　　　　Quick
Other	Plants:
　　　　　Quick
Non	JIT
Damaged	Plants:	
　　　Immediately
Other	Plants:
　　　Later	/	Avoid
Damaged	Plants:	
　　　　　High
Other	Plants:
　　　　　Non
Damaged	Plants:	
　　　　　Slow
Other	Plants:
　　　　　Slow
Figure 7:	Mutual	Complement	Network
Riken & REC In future
Nodes of the Mutual Complement Network of Production
Mutual Complement Network
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network,	 production	 system	 in	 Japanese	 automobile	manufacturers	 by	 these	 disasters.	As	 for	
recovery	speed	from	disasters,	JIT	operated	to	advantage	to	the	Japanese	automobile	industry.	In	
addition,	fundamental	issues	of	their	damages	were	unveiled.
	 As	for	TPS,	there	were	not	wrong	decisions	for	Japanese	automobile	manufacturers	to	stop	
production	lines/plants	by	both	disasters.The	comparison	of	disaster	and	depression	in	terms	of	
the	decreasing	speed/volume	of	supply	and	the	recovery	speed.	It	is	impossible	to	say	definitely	
that	the	limitation	of	the	JIT	exists.	
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